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Abstract5
Here I discuss two broad versions of human cultural evolution which currently exist in the literature6
and which emphasise different underlying dynamics. One, which originates in population-genetic-7
style modelling, emphasises how cultural selection causes some cultural variants to be favoured8
and gradually increase in frequency over others. The other, which draws more from cognitive9
science, holds that cultural change is driven by the biased transformation of cultural variants10
by individuals in non-random and consistent directions. Despite claims that cultural evolution11
is characterised by one or the other of these dynamics, these are neither mutually exclusive nor a12
dichotomy. Different domains of human culture are likely to be more or less characterised by cultural13
selection and biased transformation. Identifying cultural dynamics in real-world cultural data is14
challenging given that they can generate the same population-level patterns, such as directional15
change or cross-cultural stability, and the same cognitive and emotional mechanisms may underlie16
both cultural selection and biased transformation. Nevertheless, fine-grained historical analysis and17
lab experiments, combined with formal models to generate quantitative predictions, offer the best18
way of distinguishing them.19
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1 Introduction25
Does culture ‘evolve’? Can socially transmitted behavioural traits such as languages, attitudes,26
technological inventions, religious beliefs, scientific theories and so on, be understood as changing27
over time in a way comparable to how biological species change over time? Such a comparison28
was drawn by historical linguists long before Darwin wrote The Origin of Species [see 1], and29
was made by Darwin himself in The Descent of Man [2]. However, it was not until the 1970s30
and 1980s that serious attempts to formalise the idea of cultural evolution appeared [3–5]. These31
seminal works borrowed the tools of mathematical population genetics and adapted them to culture,32
creating models that assume behavioural traits vary across individuals, are inherited socially (not33
genetically) via imitation, language, teaching or other means of social learning, and can be subject34
to selection wherein some traits are more or less likely to be passed on than others, as well as35
non-selective dynamics in the form of cultural drift.36
These models explicitly recognised differences between genetic and cultural evolution, such as the37
possibility of acquiring cultural traits from a wide range of individuals, not just the two parents38
from whom we acquire our DNA [5], and various biases by which we do this, such as conforming to39
the majority trait in one’s group [3]. In the last two decades there has been an exponential increase40
in cultural evolution research inspired by this groundwork [6], with evolutionary concepts, tools and41
methods used to explain cultural variation and change in domains such as language, technology,42
religion, political systems, family dynamics, migration and acculturation, music, art, literature and43
more [7–10]. The notion that cultural change represents an evolutionary process is more than a44
philosophical curiosity; it potentially provides powerful new theoretical and methodological tools45
for understanding cultural change and variation that can significantly enhance and perhaps even46
synthesise the social and behavioural sciences [11–13]47
Yet there remains an underlying and ongoing tension concerning the extent to which cultural48
change resembles the process of genetic evolution1. Two broad approaches can be recognised.49
1In the following I have intentionally avoided identifying traditions with particular scholars or sets of scholars,
or with particular geographical regions. Such identification often triggers social identity-related groupishness and
defensiveness. I have tried instead to focus on the distinctive theoretical and intellectual aspects of each broad
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First, scholars more closely rooted in the tradition that began with the aforementioned population-50
genetic-style models tend to focus on how selection-like learning biases cause some cultural variants51
to be favoured and gradually increase in frequency over others [9,14–17]. Such learning biases in-52
clude preferentially copying older, prestigious or successful individuals (sometimes called ‘context53
biases’), or preferentially copying certain kinds of traits over others (sometimes called ‘content bi-54
ases’), such as stories that are emotionally salient or tools that are particularly effective [16,18,19].55
‘Copying’ here is assumed to be relatively faithful, reflecting claims that humans possess unique56
psychological adaptations for high fidelity social learning [20,21]. Less explanatory weight is placed57
on how individuals create, modify and transform cultural traits as sources of directional cultural58
change (although this is acknowledged to occur; see below). Cultural change is seen instead as59
primarily a population-level process, where small, often random changes (akin to cultural mutation60
[5]) that happen to be effective are selectively copied over time. This leads to an emphasis on61
cultural evolution as a cumulative, population-level process that often exceeds any one individual’s62
understanding or ability [22,23], and accounts for our species’ distinct ecological success [14]. Ex-63
amples of work in this tradition include field studies showing that pregnancy-related food taboos64
are preferentially learned from mothers and prestigious older women [24], lab experiments showing65
that more complex tools are maintained in larger groups due to the availability of more demonstra-66
tors from whom to learn [25], and historical analysis of Go matches showing that opening moves67
spread by being copied from successful players [26].68
Other scholars see cultural evolution differently [27–32]. Inspired more by cognitive science than69
population genetics, here cultural change is seen as primarily resulting from the directional trans-70
formation by individuals of culturally acquired information. According to this view, the acquisition71
of cultural information is rarely a case of high fidelity copying. Rather, it is a process of trans-72
formation and reinterpretation that may be affected by the receiver’s cognitive biases, pre-existing73
knowledge, individual learning, or the dynamics of communication and interaction between sender74
and receiver. Consequently, directional cultural change is seen as resulting from the directional75
transformation of information by individuals. Where individuals transform representations in the76
same direction, such as due to a universal feature of human cognition or a similar ecological or envi-77
position. Naturally, there are also many exceptions and overlap across the broad positions.
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ronmental pressure, then representations will converge on a stable type or form, sometimes called a78
‘cultural attractor’ [29–31]. Consequently, there is more focus on explaining cross-cultural regular-79
ities (rather than diversification and cumulative change) that reflect individual-level psychological80
processes (rather than exceeding individual-level understanding). This approach has also been ex-81
plored in the context of Bayesian models of cultural evolution, where individuals possess inductive82
biases - constraints on learning and memory - that shape their priors when evaluating information83
received from other individuals [32,33]. Over successive transmission episodes, representations grad-84
ually transform according to, and converge on, individuals’ inductive biases. Finally, this dynamic85
also has precedence in the earlier population-genetic inspired approach discussed above. Early86
models of ‘guided variation’ [3] involved individuals non-randomly improving cultural traits via87
reinforcement or other forms of individual learning, with such traits then culturally transmitted in88
an unbiased, non-selective manner. Again, these models show that guided variation causes cultural89
evolution to converge on the cultural traits that are favoured by individual learning.90
Examples of this second approach to cultural evolution include the cross-cultural convergence on91
blood-letting as a medical practice [34], on direct eye gaze in portraits rather than averted gaze92
[35], and on common colour terminologies [36], all of which are argued to reflect psychologically93
‘attractive’ forms. Lab experiments simulating Bayesian inductive biases have shown how partic-94
ipants independently converge on common priors, such as linear relations between variables [32],95
compositionally structured languages [37] or visually symmetrical arrowhead dimensions [38].96
These two versions of cultural evolution emphasise different dynamics, which I will call cultural se-97
lection and biased transformation respectively2. In evolutionary terms, cultural selection assumes98
small and often undirected cultural mutation followed by the selection of beneficial variants via99
non-random learning biases, with the latter selection-like process primarily driving cultural change.100
Biased transformation comprises substantial and directional mutation at the individual level which101
2Some of the scholars who I cite in association with cultural selection, e.g. [3], avoid the term ‘selection’, preferring
‘transmission bias’. Others do use the term, e.g. [5]. It seems to me that the process of selectively copying certain
other individuals (e.g. those high in prestige) or certain types of traits (e.g. more effective tools) justifies use of the
term ‘selection’, and is appropriate given the foundation of this tradition in population-genetic models. Many of
the scholars who I cite in association with biased transformation often use the term ‘cultural attraction’, but I will
avoid this term due to its ambiguity [39,40], and due to the fact that sometimes selection-like learning biases such
as conformity are included within it [29]. The term ‘biased transformation’ is used frequently in [30] to describe the
core mechanism of the cultural attraction approach, and so seems a suitable description of its key assumption.
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is primarily responsible for driving cultural change, rather than population-level selection-like learn-102
ing biases.103
It has been pointed out by some scholars [41–44] that these two dynamics represent the two terms104
in the Price Equation [45,46], a commonly-used abstract formalisation of the evolutionary process.105
The first term of the Price Equation represents change due to (cultural) selection of traits due to106
their fitness effects, and the second represents change due to (biased) transformation of traits from107
one generation to the next. While the latter transformation term is often assumed to be negligible108
in genetic evolution, the same is not the case for cultural evolution, such that biased transformation109
may be a directional source of cultural change3.110
2 Disagreements over the dynamics of cultural evolution111
Several researchers have drawn the conclusion that, if biased transformation plays a causal role in112
cultural change - in terms of the Price Equation, if the second biased transformation term is non-zero113
- then cultural change should not be described as ‘Darwinian’, and/or that methods borrowed from114
biology (e.g. population genetic modelling) are inappropriate [29,44,47,48]. For example, “it would115
seem reasonable to reserve the category ‘Darwinian’ for cases where . . . there is a prominent role116
for selection rather than transmission in explaining design-like properties” [44], p.7. Or, “in order117
to model cultural evolution, we must not simply adjust existing replicative or selectional models to118
fit the cultural case” [29], p.2. Furthermore, rather than focusing on population-level dynamics and119
selection-like learning biases, which are characteristic of cultural selection, it is argued that a more120
3This is not, however, as clear-cut as often portrayed (F.J. Weissing, pers comm). Strictly, the second term in
the Price Equation can only be equated solely with trait transformation/transmission if selection is very weak and
frequency-independent. Otherwise, the second term will be affected by factors other than transformation, such as
changes in the environment, and even in genetic systems will often be non-negligible (otherwise, fitness would always
increase or stay constant, given that the first term in the Price equation, when applied to fitness change, is a variance
and hence non-negative; on the contrary, in genetic evolution fitness may decrease, implying that the second term
must be negative). Given that cultural selection is unlikely to be very weak, and is often frequency-dependent (e.g. in
the case of conformity), these conditions are unlikely to hold for cultural evolution. This means that the second term
cannot be straightforwardly equated with ‘transformation’. There are also several other caveats and complications
with applying the Price Equation to cultural evolution [41,44]. For these reasons, I do not focus my analysis primarily
on the Price Equation, and in the models I implement cultural selection and biased transformation in a more concrete
manner.
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appropriate approach would be to focus on individual cognition, which, if biased transformation121
is the predominant driver of cultural change, may be sufficient to explain the direction of cultural122
change. For example, “[n]ovel concepts and mechanisms, more inspired by cognitive sciences and123
less by population genetics, are required [to explain cultural evolution]” [48], p.21 or “advances in124
understanding the population distribution of cultural practices or representations seem most likely125
to come from cognitive science. . . No isomorphism to Darwinian evolution is required in order to126
do this” [44], p.8.127
On the other hand, researchers who emphasise cultural selection have tended to downplay the128
importance of biased transformation for explaining cultural change. For example, one model con-129
cluded that even (actually, especially) when biased transformation is strong, the long-term cultural130
dynamics and the final equilibrium of a cultural trait are both determined by cultural selection131
[42]. According to this model, biased transformation reduces to cultural selection. Furthermore,132
while biased transformation is acknowledged in seminal texts (e.g. ‘guided variation’ in [3], as noted133
above), in practice much more attention has been given to cultural selection learning biases such134
as those related to prestige, conformity and content biases [16,18,19].135
3 Two models of cultural selection and biased transformation136
Words are imprecise means of communicating ideas. Formal models can help make this imprecision137
more precise, and reveal the often hidden assumptions of purely verbal models [49]. Consequently,138
here are two very simple individual-based models of cultural selection and biased transformation139
to illustrate what I mean above, and to draw some very simple insights. Model 1 simulates cul-140
tural selection and biased transformation within a single population to examine how each dynamic141
generates cultural change. Model 2 extends this to multiple populations and cumulative culture,142
to examine claims of cross-cultural stability and diversification. The R code for both models is143
available at https://github.com/amesoudi/culturalselection_biasedtransformation, and readers can144
play with them without needing to run the code at https://amesoudi.shinyapps.io/CSBT_model1/145
and https://amesoudi.shinyapps.io/CSBT_model2/.146
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These models are intended to complement previous models that examine these cultural dynamics147
[3,38,42,47,50–52]. The insights are not particularly novel compared to these previous studies,148
but (i) they provide a replication and confirmation of previous models’ results using different149
assumptions and implementations, thus contributing to a broad family of models addressing the150
same issue (which is often better than seeking a single ‘perfect’ model: [49]); (ii) their insights151
are integrated below with more recent empirical studies and placed within the context of ongoing152
debates concerning the nature of cultural evolution; and (iii) full code and interactive online versions153
of the models are provided alongside this paper, to allow others to directly explore the results and154
extend the models using different assumptions.155
3.1 Model 1: Within-population dynamics156
In Model 1, each of n individuals possesses a value of a continuously varying culturally transmitted157
trait which ranges from 0-100. In this model, cultural selection and biased transformation are158
assumed to act in the same direction, towards 100. Hence, higher values of the trait indicate both159
higher-payoff traits that are favoured by cultural selection, and/or more individually attractive160
traits favoured by biased transformation. The n individuals are initialised with trait values drawn161
from a normal distribution with mean of 10 and standard deviation of 1, giving slightly different162
values centred around a relatively low value.163
In each time-step, all n individuals are replaced with n new individuals. This can be seen as a new164
biological generation, or a new instantiation of the same population at a new time following cultural165
transmission. These n new individuals first each choose a demonstrator from the previous time-step166
from whom to learn (Fig 1). Cultural selection is implemented via payoff-biased social learning.167
With probability s, each individual selectively adopts the highest-value trait from the individuals168
of the previous time-step. With probability 1 − s, they adopt the trait value of a randomly-chosen169
individual from the previous time-step. Random copying is, by definition, non-selective.170
Biased transformation, as well as unbiased transformation / cultural mutation, is then implemented171
via the modification of the chosen demonstrator’s trait value (Fig 1). The chosen demonstrator’s172
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trait value is modified by an amount drawn from an exponentially modified Gaussian (EMG) distri-173
bution [53]. This distribution combines a normal/Gaussian distribution (with mean µ and standard174
deviation σ) with an exponential distribution (with scale parameter β) to give a distribution that175
is directionally skewed when β > 0. Specifically, the mean of the normal distribution µ is set to176
zero, i.e. no change to the trait value of the chosen demonstrator. Random deviation to this copied177
value is introduced when the standard deviation of the normal distribution σ is greater than one.178
This can be seen as random copying error, or blind, undirected attempts at modifying the trait179
following transmission, akin to cultural mutation [5]. The skew introduced by the scale parameter180
β generates biased transformation. When β > 0, the skewed distribution makes individuals more181
likely to transform the trait in the direction of the biased transformation, i.e. towards 100. Note182
that there is no gene-like replication in this model (unless σ = 0 and β = 0 such that the adopted183
value is exactly the same as the demonstrator’s, but in this case there is also no evolution), and184
biased transformation is probabilistic not deterministic: biased transformation can sometimes lead185
to values in the opposite direction to the bias, even when β is large.186
3.2 Discussion of Model 1187
The results of Model 1 are shown in Fig 2. The first column shows, as both intuition and previous188
models [3,44] predict, that both cultural selection and biased transformation drive the cultural trait189
towards the value favoured by each of them, i.e. the maximum value of 100. This replicates a point190
made in [44]: directional change in cultural evolution may be caused by either cultural selection or191
biased transformation (or both, as shown in the bottom row of the first column). Observing that a192
particular cultural trait has spread, be it a tool, word, song, folk tale or religious belief, therefore193
does not provide evidence that cultural selection was responsible for that spread [44]. For example,194
one recent study claimed that certain grammatical forms, such as the regularisation of past tense195
verbs, spread due to “selection in language evolution” [54]. Yet what they actually showed was196
that these grammatical forms showed a directional increase in frequency, which is consistent with197
either cultural selection or biased transformation (or both combined).198
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Figure 1: Outline of Model 1. In step 1, individuals choose a demonstrator from whom to socially
learn. With probability s they choose the demonstrator with the highest-payoff trait, characteristic
of cultural selection, and with probability 1 − s they choose a demonstrator at random, which by
definition is non-selective. In step 2, they modify the chosen demonstrator’s trait by drawing a value
from an exponentially modified Gaussian (EMG) distribution, with mean and standard deviation
of the normal distribution component set to zero and one respectively, and which is then added
to the demonstrator’s trait value. When the scale parameter of the exponential component of the
EMG, β, is zero, then this modification is entirely random, thus implementing unbiased cultural
mutation (akin to genetic mutation). When β > 0, the values are more likely to be drawn from
the upper end of the distribution, thus implementing biased transformation. The upper parts of
each box are characteristic of cultural selection, while the lower parts are characteristic of biased
transformation, although the continuous parameters s and β allow a mixture of these two dynamics
to occur together.
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Figure 2: Results of Model 1. The top row shows results representative of cultural selection
dynamics, the middle row those of biased transformation, and the bottom row of both dynamics
acting simultaneously. The first column shows time series (aka ’diffusion curves’), where either
cultural selection (via s) or biased transformation (via β) or both drives the culturally transmitted
trait to its maximum value, which is the value favoured by both cultural selection and biased
transformation. The second column shows the effect of different values of s or β on the number of
timesteps taken to reach its maximum value (specifically, to reach a trait value of 95, given that
100 may not be reached due to mutation). In the first two cases, as cultural selection or biased
transformation increase in strength, the faster is the spread of the favoured trait. The middle
bottom panel shows a heatmap of the same measure (t = timesteps until trait 95 is reached) for
different non-zero combinations of s and β. The final column shows the effect of population size,
n, on time to reach the maximum. Here, cultural selection is more effective in larger populations,
while population size has no effect on the action of biased transformation. When both dynamics
are acting, there is a weaker effect of population size. n = number of individuals, β = strength of
biased transformation, s = probability of cultural selection, σ = random, undirected mutation. All
results are the average of 10 independent simulation runs.
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However, this works the other way too. It does not necessarily follow that all instances of directional199
change are therefore due to biased transformation. For example, the demonstration that direct eye200
gaze in portraits has increased in frequency over time [35] does not necessarily mean, as claimed in201
the original study, that this was due to biased transformation as individual artists modified their202
style from averted to direct eye gaze. It could equally have been cultural selection, with novice203
portrait artists preferentially copying other artists that painted direct eye gaze, or preferentially204
copying direct eye gaze portraits, rather than individually transforming their style from averted205
gaze to direct gaze. Or it could have been a mixture of the two dynamics, with preferential copying206
of direct eye gaze artists or portraits, combined with individual transformation towards direct eye207
gaze.208
How then can we distinguish between cultural selection and biased transformation in real-life in-209
stances of cultural evolution? Fig 2 provides some suggestions. The first column shows that cultural210
selection is characterised by an s-shaped diffusion curve, which starts slow, increases in rate, and211
then levels off. Biased transformation is characterised by an r-shaped diffusion curve, which in-212
creases at a constant rate until reaching the maximum. It has been suggested that diffusion curve213
shape can be used to distinguish cultural selection and biased transformation [55], and because214
most diffusion curves in the diffusion of innovations literature in sociology are s-shaped [56], that215
the typical mode of technological and social change in human societies is driven by cultural selec-216
tion rather than biased transformation [55]. Non-human social learning researchers have also used217
s-shaped diffusion curves to argue that certain behaviours spread via social rather than asocial218
learning [57]. Unfortunately, however, the use of diffusion curve shape to infer learning dynamics219
has been deemed unreliable since it was shown that s-shaped curves can also be generated by non-220
cultural selection dynamics under certain circumstances, such as when there is individual variation221
in the strength of biased transformation [58,59].222
The final column of Fig 2 shows another difference. As is well known from evolutionary biology,223
the strength of natural selection depends on the variation in the population (known as Fisher’s224
Fundamental Theorem). In principle, the same applies to cultural selection. Consequently, cultural225
selection is more effective in larger populations where there is more variation upon which to act.226
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Biased transformation, on the other hand, is an individual-level process. Transformation occurs227
at the same rate irrespective of what trait values others in the population possess. Consequently,228
biased transformation shows no relation to population size (see [50,52] for similar findings).229
This links to an ongoing debate concerning the effect of population size and other demographic230
factors in cultural evolution [25,60–63]. There has been much back and forth between those who231
argue that the rate of cultural evolution is partly determined by population size [61,62] and those232
who argue that it is not [63]. While some of this debate concerns the reliability of the empirical233
record, it may be worthwhile turning the debate on its head. Perhaps those instances where234
population size does seem to determine the rate of cultural evolution, mostly relating to technology235
[61,64], can be taken as evidence of cultural selection operating in that domain. Instances where236
population size does not seem to affect the rate of cultural evolution, as observed for example237
for folk tales [65], can be taken as evidence of biased transformation operating in that domain.238
However, this requires overcoming empirical issues surrounding estimates of population size and239
structure [60], measures which may not always be available or reliable.240
Alternatively, there can be more direct examination of cultural variation and change to explicitly241
test for cultural selection and biased transformation. This requires going beyond population-level242
signatures and delving into the history and function of specific cultural traits. For example, one243
innovative study examined the long-term cultural evolution of the “f-holes” in violins [66], the holes244
in the body of the instrument that improve sound quality by enhancing acoustic conductance. These245
holes gradually evolved over several centuries from relatively ineffective circular holes in the 10th246
century to the now-standard f-holes in the 18th century, which hugely enhance sound quality. Using247
formal analysis of the variation in hole shape over time, it was shown that this change in shape248
was so gradual as to be consistent with random, undirected changes introduced by each generation249
of violin-maker due to imperfections in the manufacturing process. Within each generation, those250
violins that happened to sound better were selectively copied, and those that happened to sound251
worse were not. There were no disruptive or directional changes within generations, and no evidence252
that violin-makers were directionally transforming the hole shapes to improve sound quality. This253
is probably because the effects of violin holes on acoustic conductance are complex, opaque and254
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unintuitive. It is not cognitively intuitive that f-shaped holes give better acoustic conductance than255
any other shaped hole, and the design space of possible hole shapes combined with possible violin256
designs is too vast to easily solve with trial and error within a single lifetime.257
There were even counterexamples to demonstrate this point [66]. In two cases (Savart’s trapezoidal258
design and Chanot’s guitar-shaped design), early 19th century violin makers attempted to use259
contemporary scientific principles to create novel violin designs that were beyond the normal range260
of random variation. Yet these designs had poorer acoustic properties than the standard designs,261
and are now-forgotten evolutionary dead-ends. This study therefore provides quantitative evidence262
not only that the dynamics of cultural selection - small, undirected, random variation plus selective263
copying - were responsible for the cumulative cultural evolution of violin designs, but that this264
makes adaptive sense given the complexity and opacity of this particular cultural trait.265
As well as historical analyses, one might also use lab experiments to obtain independent evidence266
that an instance of directional change is consistent with biased transformation or cultural selection.267
For example, one study which argued that blood-letting as a medical practice has independently268
emerged cross-culturally due to biased transformation presented a series of lab experiments showing269
that (i) stories containing blood-letting are more memorable, and persist for longer, than equiv-270
alent stories involving other therapies, and (ii) descriptions of accidental cuts can spontaneously271
transform into stories about blood-letting [34]. This provides independent evidence that individual272
cognition drives biased transformation to favour blood-letting, lending plausibility to the claim that273
biased transformation has generated the cross-cultural stability of blood-letting in actual human274
societies.275
We should be cautious, however, in drawing too strong conclusions from lab experiments, and too276
closely identifying biased transformation with cognition. It is possible that the same cognitive mech-277
anism can underpin both biased transformation and cultural selection4. For example, experimental278
4By ‘cognitive mechanism’ I mean a bias to attend to, process or recall information in a particular way. Such
a mechanism would operate at a lower level than broader cultural ‘dynamics’ such as cultural selection and biased
transformation, which describe how cultural traits are transformed and transmitted by and between individuals.
Hence, cognitive mechanisms and cultural dynamics are alternative (and complementary) levels of analysis. Generally,
it is desirable to unpack higher-level descriptions of social learning strategies (e.g. the ‘payoff-biased copying’ that I
use as a form of cultural selection here) into their underlying psychological mechanisms [67].
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studies using the transmission chain method [68], where information is passed from individual to279
individual along linear chains, have identified an advantage for emotionally salient information in280
cultural evolution, particularly content that elicits a reaction of disgust [69,70]. However, this could281
in principle occur via either biased transformation or cultural selection (or both): individuals may282
directionally transform what they receive from others to make it more disgusting (biased transfor-283
mation), and/or they may preferentially attend to, acquire and pass on more disgusting material284
than less disgusting material (cultural selection).285
One study demonstrated that both of these dynamics are present and can cause the spread of dis-286
gusting information as people both transformed and selectively acquired and passed on disgusting287
material [69]. Most transmission chain experiments, however, can by design only detect transfor-288
mation [68]. It is sometimes argued that because a particular form is favoured at the end of an289
experimental transmission chain [71], then this indicates that biased transformation is the domi-290
nant force in real-world cultural evolution [32]. Yet without explicitly demonstrating that the same291
directional change could not also be generated by cultural selection, such a strong conclusion may292
not be warranted. Similarly, other effects documented experimentally using the transmission chain293
method, including advantages for social information [72,73], minimally counter-intuitive concepts294
[74] and negative information [75,76], may be equally effective when operating via cultural selection295
as they have been demonstrated to be via biased transformation.296
Finally, we can also draw a parallel between payoff-biased social learning (the form of cultural297
selection that is assumed in Model 1; see Fig 1), where traits associated with higher monetary, social298
or reproductive payoffs are preferentially copied, and the form of biased transformation modelled in299
[3] as guided variation, in which traits that are associated with higher payoffs are reinforced during300
an individual’s lifetime via instrumental conditioning. In both cases, a psychological preference for301
high payoffs causes an increase in high-payoff traits, in the former via cultural selection, and in302
the latter via biased transformation. The general point here is that the same cognitive, social or303
emotional mechanisms can underlie both biased transformation and cultural selection. We should304
therefore not necessarily identify biased transformation specifically with ‘cognition’, when the same305
psychological mechanisms may also underlie cultural selection dynamics.306
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3.3 Model 2: Between-population dynamics and cumulative culture307
Another common claim is that biased transformation can explain cross-cultural stability, i.e. simi-308
larity in cultural traits across different populations, societies or groups. Sometimes this is turned309
around: that evidence of cross-cultural stability in a particular trait can be taken as evidence for310
the operation of biased transformation [30]. Yet it seems logical that cultural selection can also311
generate cross-cultural stability. One way it can do this is if there is a single high-payoff trait on312
which cultural selection converges, as in Model 1. If there are multiple high-payoff traits, i.e. mul-313
tiple cultural lineages, then cultural selection may generate cross-cultural divergence if different314
populations converge on different solutions to a problem. However, if there is some migration or315
inter-cultural transmission [51], then again multiple populations may converge on the same solution.316
Model 2 simulates this latter scenario.317
Assume now that there are discrete cultural traits structured as shown in Fig 3. There is a single318
intuitive or attractive trait, X. This might be blood-letting as a medical practice, for example.319
Assume it has a payoff of zero, and that the same biased transformation process as implemented320
in Model 1 favours trait X (in fact, blood-letting is suggested to decrease fitness due to the greater321
chance of blood infections [34], but for our purposes fitness neutrality is a reasonable conservative322
assumption). There are also three trait lineages, A, B and C, representing increasingly effective323
(high payoff) solutions to the same problem. They might represent, for example, herbal medicine,324
allopathic medicine, and surgery. Each lineage has five cumulative levels. These are cumulative in325
the sense that the preceding trait (e.g. B3) must be known before the subsequent trait (e.g. B4) can326
be acquired, and they increase in payoffs (e.g. B4 has higher payoff than B3). Consequently, the327
same cultural selection process as implemented in Model 1, selective payoff-biased social learning,328
favours increasing levels of each lineage. Unlike Model 1, therefore, in this model biased transfor-329
mation and cultural selection act in opposite directions: biased transformation towards trait X, and330
cultural selection away from trait X. Finally, the lineages may vary in their payoffs for equivalent331
traits. When d > 0, then traits in lineage C have higher payoffs than the equivalent traits in lineage332
B, and traits in lineage B have higher payoffs than the equivalents in lineage A.333
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To examine cross-cultural stability, we assume g groups each containing n individuals. In each334
time-step, individuals in each group first select a demonstrator from within their own group. As335
before, they select the demonstrator with the highest payoff with probability s, and a random336
member of their group with probability 1 − s. This is cultural selection. Their final adopted trait337
is determined by a similar process of biased transformation as in Model 1, but modified to handle338
discrete traits5 and always favouring transformation towards X. For example, if the demonstrator339
has trait A4, when β > 0, then A3 is more likely to be adopted than A5. As in Model 1, the process340
is probabilistic, so movement in the opposite direction is also possible; this is how high-payoff traits341
appear that are then favoured by cultural selection when s > 0. Finally, there is migration. With342
probability m, each individual moves to a new group chosen at random (Wright’s island model; see343
[51] for details). This can be seen as either individuals actually moving to a new group and taking344
their traits with them, or a process of inter-group transmission as a member of one group interacts345
with and adopts the trait of a member of another group.346
3.4 Discussion of Model 2347
Representative results are shown in Fig 4. As expected, when biased transformation is the only348
process operating (Fig 4, top), then we see cross-cultural stability as each group converges on349
the intuitive, attractive trait X. While the probabilistic process of biased transformation sometimes350
leads to the emergence of high payoff traits, in the absence of cultural selection to select these traits,351
biased transformation drives cultural evolution back to trait X. When cultural selection is the only352
process operating (Fig 4, middle), then we see cross-cultural divergence. Each group converges353
on the highest-payoff trait within a different lineage (note that, by chance, sometimes groups354
can end up independently converging on the same trait; this would be an instance of convergent355
cultural evolution and is not shown in Fig 4. However, if there are a large enough number of356
5To modify the biased transformation process to handle discrete traits, a continuous number is drawn from an
EMG distribution with a Gaussian mean of zero, standard deviation σ (typically set to 1), and exponential scale
parameter β, as in Model 1. If this value lies between -1 and 1, then the individual adopts the demonstrator’s trait
with no modification. If the value is greater than 1, then the individual adopts the next trait in that lineage closest to
X (e.g. C4 becomes C3; A2 becomes A1). A1, B1 and C1 all become X. If the value is less than -1, then the individual
adopts the next trait in that lineage in the opposite direction (e.g. C4 becomes C5; A2 becomes A3). Lineages are
bounded at X and A5/B5/C5. All individuals start with no trait before initially acquiring trait X.
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Figure 3: Trait structure in Model 2. There is a single intuitive, cognitively attractive trait,
X, which is favoured by biased transformation. Cultural selection, in the form of payoff-biased
social learning, favours traits along three trait lineages, A, B and C. These lineages comprise five
traits each (A1-A5, B1-B5 and C1-C5), with each level increasing in payoff (w). Cultural selection
therefore favours traits higher in each lineage. In addition, when d > 0, the equivalent traits in
lineage C have higher payoffs than lineage B, and those in lineage B have higher payoffs than lineage
A. The initial transition from trait X to either A1, B1 or C1 is equally likely (p=1/3 for each).
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groups relative to number of trait lineages, then some divergence would be expected). Finally,357
when cultural selection is combined with a small amount of migration or inter-group contact (Fig358
4, bottom), then each group converges on the highest-payoff trait from the highest-payoff lineage,359
trait C5. Hence we see cross-cultural stability resulting from cultural selection plus a small amount360
of migration / inter-group contact. Migration has no effect when biased transformation is the361
dominant cultural dynamic as in the top panel of Fig 4, because almost every individual in every362
group already possesses the same trait X6.363
The convergence on high payoff traits due to cultural selection plus migration resembles the advan-364
tage of partial connectivity shown in previous lab experiments [77] and models [78]. This occurs365
when there are multiple traits varying in payoff, and when relatively infrequent migration or inter-366
cultural contact causes high payoff traits to spread across groups. Full connectivity can lead to367
the premature convergence on a low payoff trait, while no connectivity prevents convergence of any368
kind. For our purposes, it does not matter so much whether convergence is premature and subop-369
timal, just that cultural selection plus migration (or some kind of inter-group contact) generates370
cross-cultural stability.371
How then can we distinguish between cross-cultural stability due to biased transformation and cross-372
cultural stability due to cultural selection plus migration? Historical analysis will be useful here373
given that the former should show no cumulative change, while the latter should. The presence of374
prior, less effective forms of a trait would indicate cultural selection. One might also track instances375
of migration or between-society contact that bring traits across historical group boundaries, which376
would indicate convergence via cultural selection. Again, violin f-holes might be a good real-world377
example of both of these cases, given that they were shown to gradually improve over several378
centuries towards higher-payoff (i.e. better acoustic quality) forms, and that all modern violins379
have converged on the same design due to communication and comparison across different inventor380
lineages [66].381
6When both biased transformation and cultural selection are operating simultaneously (not shown in Fig 4), we
see the emergence of transient cultural traditions that accumulate for a while before reverting back to trait X. This
results in different trait lineages emerging in the same group over time even in the absence of migration. Even
with these simple assumptions, interesting cultural dynamics emerge from the interplay of cultural selection, biased
transformation and migration. Readers can explore this at https://amesoudi.shinyapps.io/CSBT_model2/.
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Figure 4: Indicative runs of Model 2. In each plot, each row represents a single individual, and
columns represent time-steps. Each row therefore shows how an individual’s cultural trait changes
over time. Traits are color-coded according to Fig 3, with the intuitive trait X shown in grey, the
A lineage in oranges, B lineage in greens and C lineage in purples. The darker the shading, the
higher the trait payoff. Individuals are in one of three groups separated with dotted lines, with
ten individuals per group. The top plot shows how biased transformation via β generates cross-
cultural stability, with each group independently converging on the attractive trait X. The middle
plot shows divergence due to cultural selection via s, with each group converging on a different trait
lineage. The bottom plot shows convergence on the higest-payoff lineage (C), as migration via m
causes C traits to spread to other groups. β = strength of biased transformation, s = probability
of cultural selection, m = probability of between-group migration. In all cases, σ = 1, n = 10,
d = 0.5 and g = 3. 20
Finally, experimental evidence can be used to explore whether a cross-culturally stable cultural382
trait is attractive or intuitive, e.g. where transmission chains converge on this form, suggesting a383
role for biased transformation as in [34], or whether the trait is unintuitive, difficult to learn and384
easily lost, suggesting a role for cultural selection, as in [66]. Such experimental evidence should385
be conducted cross-culturally and demonstrate that biased transformation acts individually in the386
same direction in as many of the societies in which it is or has been observed at the population387
level as possible. If instead the biased transformation dynamic is specific only to certain societies388
and not others, then biased transformation would be a less likely explanation for cross-cultural389
stability.390
4 General discussion391
Cultural evolution is often described as comprising two distinct dynamics: cultural selection and392
biased transformation. Cultural selection involves small, often undirected modification of cultural393
traits, followed by the selective copying of certain kinds of individuals or traits. Biased transfor-394
mation involves the directional modification or transformation of adopted cultural traits often in395
consistent directions across individuals and societies. These two dynamics are sometimes presented396
as alternative models for human cultural evolution, and the presence of the latter is sometimes used397
to argue against the notion that cultural change comprises a Darwinian evolutionary process.398
Here I have presented and discussed the results of two simple models in the context of recent em-399
pirical work, to try to clarify these issues. Model 1 reinforces the conclusions of previous models400
[3,42,44,47] that directional change in cultural evolution can be generated by either biased transfor-401
mation or cultural selection, or both acting together. The two dynamics are not mutually exclusive,402
and can potentially combine to act in the same direction. Importantly, the presence of directional403
cultural change alone cannot be taken as evidence for one or the other dynamic. Furthermore, the404
same psychological mechanisms (e.g. preferences for disgust-eliciting or minimally counter-intuitive405
information, or a preference for high-payoff outcomes) can potentially underlie directional change406
generated by both cultural selection and biased transformation. Model 1 also showed that there407
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may be some population-level signatures that can be used to distinguish between the dynamics,408
specifically the shape of diffusion curves and the effect of population size, but these have limitations.409
Similarly, Model 2 illustrates that cross-cultural stability in cultural evolution can be generated by410
either biased transformation or cultural selection (plus migration), again reflecting previous model411
results [38,50–52]. Like for directional change, the presence of cross-cultural stability alone cannot412
be taken as evidence for one or the other. In fact, there are multiple causes of apparent cross-413
cultural stability: biased transformation due to universal cognitive mechanisms or inductive biases,414
biased transformation due to individual (e.g. reinforcement) learning in similar ecological conditions,415
cultural selection due to payoff-biased copying in similar ecological conditions, or cultural selection416
combined with migration (as in Model 2).417
For both directional change and cross-cultural stability, further historical and experimental evi-418
dence is needed to identify the dynamics generating that phenomenon. The empirical examples419
discussed above should indicate that there is evidence for both cultural selection and biased trans-420
formation in human cultural evolution. Violin designs [66], given their complexity, opacity and421
unintuitiveness, have been largely driven by cultural selection, given that the extent of change422
in each generation is consistent with accidental and undirected mutation due to craftsmanship423
limitations. The same probably applies to similarly complex and opaque technologies such as glass-424
ware [79] and metalworking [80]. In contrast, blood-letting as a medical practice [34], given its425
intuitive fit with cognitive biases (folk theories of illness), appears to have been largely driven by426
biased transformation, given experimental evidence that neutral descriptions regularly transform427
into blood-letting descriptions and the ineffectiveness of blood-letting as a medical practice (ruling428
out payoff-driven cultural selection). The same probably applies to direct eye gaze in portraits [35]429
and colour terminologies [36], which similarly reflect intuitive cognitive or perceptual biases.430
This suggests that cultural selection and biased transformation may operate on different domains431
of culture [39]. In those domains where favoured variants are unintuitive or exceed what individual432
learning alone can produce, such as science, modern technologies or complex socio-political insti-433
tutions, then cultural selection may be the predominant driver of cultural change. This cultural434
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change becomes cumulative when it exceeds the scope of individual learning [81,82], thus leading435
to diversification as different populations accumulate different non-intuitive solutions to the same436
problems (assuming a multimodal fitness landscape, which is a reasonable assumption for domains437
such as complex technology or socio-political institutions). In those domains where favoured vari-438
ants are intuitive or within the scope of individual rediscovery (sometimes called the ‘zone of latent439
solutions’ [81]), such as artistic traditions, folk tales, folk medicine or food preferences, then biased440
transformation may be the predominant driver of cultural change. This cultural change is unlikely441
to be cumulative across generations, and less likely to result in cross-cultural divergence.442
The conclusions regarding cross-cultural diversification and cumulative culture drawn from Model443
2 depend on the assumptions that there is a single culturally attractive trait (in Model 2 labelled444
X) that is favoured by biased transformation, and that cultural selection can lead to multiple445
trait lineages. This seems like a reasonable assumption given empirical case studies to date, each446
of which find or assume a single attractor, e.g. blood-letting [34], direct eye gaze [35], colour447
terms consistent with the World Colour Survey [36], linear relationships between variables [32] or448
symmetrical arrowhead designs [38]. However, where there are different ecological pressures in449
different areas, then biased transformation may equally generate cross-cultural divergence (for an450
experimental demonstration of this, see [83]). This is especially likely when biased transformation451
takes the relatively open-ended and flexible form of individual learning (‘guided variation’ in [3]),452
rather than convergence on an ecologically-independent cognitive universal. It is less easy to see453
how biased transformation can result in cumulative cultural change given that it is, by definition,454
bounded by individual cognition and learning, and drives cultural traits back to intuitive, simple455
forms. Nevertheless, distortions arising from biased transformation may serve as variation upon456
which cultural selection may act, such that biased transformation may play a role in cumulative457
cultural evolution in combination with cultural selection. Model 2 could be extended to explore458
these interactions.459
A further limitation of the present models is the lack of individual differences in the operation460
of both cultural selection and biased transformation. Different individuals may employ cultural461
selection processes such as payoff-biased social learning to different extents, influenced by such462
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factors as cultural background and subsistence [84–86]. In the context of biased transformation,463
different individuals in the same population may possess different inductive priors (beyond the464
external ecological differences noted in the previous paragraph), which models show may result in465
different population-level outcomes to any of those specific individual priors [87].466
In conclusion, there should be no debate over whether cultural evolution is characterised by cultural467
selection or biased transformation: it is characterised by both, weighted differently for different468
domains, with this weighting being an empirical issue in each case. Whether this justifies calling469
cultural evolution ‘Darwinian’ or not depends on how one defines the term ‘Darwinian’.7 While470
some prefer to restrict the term ‘Darwinian’ to a selection-only system akin to genetic evolution [44],471
my preference would be to see genetic and cultural evolution as two different instances of Darwinian472
evolutionary processes. In cultural evolution, biased transformation is clearly much more important473
than it is in genetic evolution. But selection is also present. Cultural evolutionists can have the474
best of both worlds: borrowing tools from biology where appropriate, such as population genetic475
modelling techniques or phylogenetic methods, but also drawing on cognitive science to study biased476
transformation-related inductive biases. Focusing on just one of these dynamics seems misguided.477
For example, focusing solely on biased transformation will obscure the important role of population478
size and structure on patterns of cultural evolution [60], and ignore the diverging historical cultural479
lineages that result in cross-cultural variation [82]. On the other hand, focusing solely on cultural480
selection will downplay the important role of individual cognition and communication in cultural481
evolution [31], and obscure unique phenomena such as repeated learning and refinement during the482
lifetime [89,90] that have no precedent in genetic evolution.483
7Perhaps a minor historical point, but Darwin himself argued that ‘use and disuse’, by which he meant the
Lamarckian-like inheritance of characteristics acquired during an individual’s lifetime, played a major role in the
evolution of biological species [88]. To the extent that this resembles biased transformation, then given that biased
transformation was present in Darwin’s original scheme, it is perhaps historically accurate to include biased transfor-
mation under the descriptor ‘Darwinian’ (but not ‘neo-Darwinian’, after it was shown during the modern synthesis
that acquired characteristics are not inherited genetically: [11]).
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